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Abstract 
Public service motivation (PSM) is understudied within ‘tough governance settings’ such Iraq’s, 
as it transitioned from dictatorship to democracy amidst civil unrest. Debates surrounding a 
universal construct of PSM currently focus on whether a love of public institutions is an essential 
component, or if measures of self-sacrifice will suffice. Results from a multidimensional PSM 
measure previously utilized in western settings are used here in Iraq. The results demonstrate 
that items from typical PSM dimensions remain in the model, but the pro-social, self-sacrifice 
dimension is the only reliable subscale. Reinforcing a pro-social foundation of PSM, a pro-social 
unidimensional measure fits the data well and respondents themselves define ‘public service’ in 
pro-social terms. Showing little connection to institutions, PSM in Iraq correlates with public 
servants determining the public interest based on their knowledge of their communities and of 
citizens and less on professional expertise, adopted plans or on guidance from elected officials. 
Contrary to reports of a divided Iraq, PSM scores are similar across regions. These insights have 
implications for PSM measurement, governance choices in developing countries, and 
comparative public administration research. 
Introduction 
Public service motivation (PSM) research has examined, at a minimum, some 73 different 
nation-states (Perry 2014, Ritz et al. 2016, Van der Wal 2015), while refining the PSM construct. 
However, PSM is understudied in ‘tough governance settings’ (Van der Wal 2015: 83), such as 
that of Iraq. ‘Tough governance settings’ are defined as those experiencing corruption, unsafe 
political climates, low public sector capacity, and international pressures for public service 
reform (Andrews 2013; Van der Wal 2015). Iraq has experienced significant institutional changes 
in its transition from a dictatorial regime to a democratic system over a short time frame, along 
with persecution, terrorism and ethno-religious divisions (Al-Ali 2014; Barsoum 2016; Hussain 
and Ahmad 2015; Kim 2015; Moloney and Chu 2016; Van der Wal 2015). Perry and Wise’s 
original definition of public service motivation is ‘an individual’s predisposition to respond to 
motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations’ (1990: 368). 
However, what happens to PSM if public institutions are contested or in flux? Iraq is the focus of 
this study because of its ‘tough’ context which is contrary to the majority of past PSM research 
(80 per cent in Europe or the United States) (Van der Wal 2015: 69) conducted in stable nations 
with established institutions and public service systems. 
To advance PSM research, Perry and Vandenabeele (2015) call for separating the PSM construct 
into its components, thereby allowing for an examination of how PSM differs by regime type 
and allowing for a better understanding of the role of institutions. For this article we follow 
Perry and Vandenabeele’s (2015) direction by providing an overview of the PSM construct and 
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its components, with particular attention to debates over whether institutions or self-sacrifice 
are the foundation for PSM. In addition to testing whether institutions or self-sacrifice should be 
the foundation for a universal measure of PSM, we explore what difference those foundational 
concepts might mean for ‘tough governance settings’. We explore using PSM concepts to 
analyse regimes over time and inform governance choices within developing countries. As a 
result, we discuss the Iraqi context in terms of regime types over time along with our 
expectations for the PSM construct in Iraq. After the data and methods section we cover results 
and conclusions. We explain our model’s performance including which survey items remain in 
each of the typical PSM components (Politics and Policies; Public Interest, Compassion and 
Equality, Self-sacrifice, Bureaucratic Governance and Customer Orientation) and compare the 
performance of a multidimensional measure and a unidimensional measure. We also discuss the 
results of open-ended survey questions, where Iraqi public servants define in their own words 
what ‘public service’ means to them. The model and content analysis results show the reliability 
and validity of the self-sacrifice component of PSM in the Iraqi context. There is also a good fit 
between a unidimensional pro-social measure of PSM and the Iraqi data. 
Overall, the findings indicate that a lack of stable institutions does not mean a lack of PSM, but it 
does suggest that a pro-social and self-sacrifice oriented measure is more likely to perform 
better as a universal measure of PSM than one predicated on a loyalty to a given institution. Our 
findings also suggest that in ‘tough governance settings’ an emphasis on institutions overlooks 
self-sacrifice as a building block for public service and governance in general. We begin the 
process of tying PSM to regime type by using comparative public administration typologies in 
this study. Bringing PSM and comparative public administration literatures together can advance 
both (O’Leary and Van Slyke 2010). 
Defining the PSM construct and components 
Originally, Perry and Wise (1990) grounded public service motivation in a dedication to public 
institutions. As they defined public service motivation, they divided motives into categories: 
rational, norm-based and affective. Rational motives include the fashioning of public policy and 
advocating for particular policies. Norm-based motives include a loyalty to government and 
serving the public interest. Affective motives encompass the pursuit of noble causes. Using 
these foundational concepts, Perry (1996) created a measure of public service motivation. He 
defined six components: attraction to public policy-making, commitment to the public interest, 
sense of civic duty, pursuit of social justice, compassion and a spirit of self-sacrifice. Survey items 
measuring the components were tested and the overall Public Service Motivation (PSM) scale 
was revised to include four subscales: attraction to policy-making (wanting to work with 
politicians and contributing impartial information), commitment to the public interest (a pillar of 
public service is striving for the best for the public in general), compassion (having an emotional 
response to the welfare of others), and self-sacrifice (putting others ahead of yourself). 
Perry’s measure has been tested and modified over time (Bozeman and Su 2015; Francois 2000; 
Kim 2009a, 2009b; Kim and Vandenabeele 2010; Kim et al. 2013; Kim 2017; Perry and 
Vandenabeele 2015; Rayner et al. 2017; Schott et al. 2015; Vandenabeele et al. 2006; 
Vandenabeele 2008; Vandenabeele and Van de Walle 2008; Wright et al. 2013). Seeking a 
universal foundation for PSM, researchers have attempted to disentangle the rational, norm 
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based, and affective motives. Vandenabeele (2008) validates part of the original Perry model 
(politics and policies, public interest, compassion, self-sacrifice), but adds the dimension of 
‘democratic governance’ or provision of good public service to everyone. Coursey and Pandey 
(2007) successfully tested a three-subscale version, including policy-making, public interest and 
compassion, leaving out self-sacrifice. In refining Perry’s measure, the self-sacrifice and the 
public interest subscales have proven to be highly correlated (Vandenabeele 2008) implying that 
the ‘public interest’ could be a universal ‘doing good for others’. 
While other researchers leave out the self-sacrifice dimension, Kim and Vandenabeele (2010) 
describe self-sacrifice as the foundation of PSM. Their universal measure draws on motives that 
are value-based, focusing on sacrifice for others, rule of law and participation in policy 
formation. They question the usefulness of the traditional ‘attraction to policy making’ 
dimension because it can be influenced by negative reactions to particular politicians and 
policies rather than measuring a desire to guide policy alone. In addition, the traditional items 
measuring politics and policy-making are worded so that a negative response actually 
contributes positively to the overall PSM scale. This type of wording in ‘opposite directions’ lacks 
clarity, particularly across languages (DeVellis 2003; Netemeyer et al. 2003; Perry and 
Vandenabeele 2015). Kim and Vandenabeele’s (2010) proposed universal measure addresses 
these issues by including items measuring the dimensions of: attraction to public participation, 
commitment to public values, compassion and self-sacrifice. Kim (2009a) honed Perry’s 
attraction to policy-making items replacing ones concerning politicians with others that more 
directly measured interest in policies. Kim et al. (2013) tested PSM items across twelve countries 
and found a four-factor structure: attraction to public service, commitment to public values, 
compassion and self-sacrifice; however, ultimately they raised concerns that there may be no 
universal measure of PSM. 
While the Politics and Policy-making survey items try to address rational PSM motives, Bozeman 
and Su (2015) contend that there really is no difference between PSM and altruism. This returns 
us to public servants’ affective motives, abandoning loyalty to government (norm based) or 
public interest (rational based) motives. The pro-social foundation of PSM takes institutions out 
of the picture, making altruism the universal component that could cross cultures. A test of PSM 
measures related to ‘chance to benefit society’ and ‘chance to make a contribution to an 
important decision’ in China found the first construct to be significant while the latter was not 
(Ko and Han 2013). Existing global measures related to PSM demonstrate a relationship with 
measures of pro-social behaviours (Christensen et al. 2017; Wright et al. 2013). Showing the 
persistence of pro-social motives, Brænder and Andersen (2013) find the self-sacrifice 
dimension remains unchanged in soldiers before and after deployment to war. Brewer et al. 
(2000) define PSM as a pro-social concept of being a ‘public servant’ and identify four types: 
samaritans, communitarians, patriots and humanitarians. They find that none of these four 
groups is fond of politics or politicians and that policy-making is not their principle incentive. 
However, the pro-social concept does not help with understanding how public servants 
determine what ‘good’ to do for others and whether that good is in the public interest or not. 




The emphasis on pro-social behaviours underpins a unidimensional measure of PSM. Single item 
measures of PSM typically ask about pro-social preferences to work in social service fields, to 
help others, or to be useful to society (Wright and Christensen 2010; Wright et al. 2013). A five-
item unidimensional measure has been used referencing motivations to serve the public, 
making a difference in society, sacrificing for the good of society, understanding how dependent 
we are on one another and looking out for the rights of others (Kim 2017). Developing a 
unidimensional measure is important for efficiently testing PSM theory, avoiding long surveys 
and measuring PSM across countries (Kim 2017; Wright et al. 2013). However, a unidimensional 
measure of PSM is not as rich as multidimensional measures and does not contribute to settling 
nuanced questions about the meaning of PSM across countries, such as, ‘Does being public 
service motivated imply supporting efficiency, responsibility, democracy, integrity, transparency, 
or responsiveness?’ (Schott et al. 2015: 689). Schott et al. note, ‘the fuzziness of the concept of 
PSM is related to the fact that it incorporates another vague concept: the public interest’ (Schott 
et al. 2015: 692). Multidimensional measures help explain mixed results when using PSM as a 
predictor of other variables like job performance, job satisfaction, and person-organization fit 
(Kim 2017; Schott et al. 2015). Vandenabeele and Van de Walle (2008), using survey data from 
the International Social Survey Program, showed that PSM is seemingly a universal concept, but 
that its constituent dimensions are not necessarily universal. 
After discussing the recent research into a universal measure of PSM (Kim and Vandenabeele 
2010; Kim et al. 2013), Perry (2014: 40) returns to a definition of PSM that includes ‘loyalty to 
governance institutions’ and multiple components. Perry and Vandenabeele (2015) note that 
the ‘politics and policymaking’ dimension is trying to tap into a fidelity to governing regimes, 
which could vary depending on regime type (parliamentary, presidential, one party control, 
pluralism, etc.) They emphasize that including multiple dimensions of PSM in a universal 
measure allows researchers to parse what was important to PSM in different contexts. Moloney 
and Chu (2016) use Perry’s (1996) PSM measure in Jamaica which experiences high levels of 
corruption. They found three latent variables measuring PSM in Jamaica that were related to 
civic duty, self-sacrifice and commitment to the public interest plus compassion plus social 
justice. PSM scores were high despite being within a system beset with weak institutions and an 
‘informer’ culture. Jamaica shares Judeo-Christian and democratic values with countries that 
have seen significant PSM research, though on the other hand, it has not experienced their 
wealth and transparent legal-administrative contexts. Moloney and Chu suggest proceeding 
with comparative studies that can ‘isolate common latent variables across cultures, explore 
differences, and propose concept modifications’ (2016: 450). Like Jamaica, Iraq is a democracy 
and former British colony. Unlike Jamaica, Iraq is a new democracy facing sectarian violence. 
Studying a country such as Iraq, which is operating under ‘[t]he accumulated burdens of coup-
de-tats, sanctions, and wars’ (Rihani 2015: 121), can help explain which, if any, PSM components 
prevail in tough governance settings. 
THE IRAQI CONTEXT: INSTITUTIONS AND REGIME TYPES 
Multidimensional PSM measures seem to be starting from the assumption that public servants 
are operating within modernist and western systems, where there is political and professional 
bureaucratic accountability, citizen involvement, formal legal norms tied to basic human rights, 
and, thus, institutional capacity (Heady 2001; Jreisat 1997; Jreisat 2012; Kulcsár 1991). Jreisat 
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(2012) notes that this type of public administration is not often found in developing 
administrative systems like that of contemporary Iraq. A brief history of the major political and 
bureaucratic regime shifts in the country will provide clues as to what might constitute PSM in 
Iraq (Goetz 2001; Heady 2001; Jreisat 2012). 
From the first period of Ottoman control through contemporary Iraq, the political/bureaucratic 
regimes in Iraq fall into four categories: traditional elite, collegial bureaucratic elite, dominant-
party mobilization and polyarchal competitive (Heady 2001). Traditional elite systems have 
political elites who claim power based on inherited monarchic, aristocratic or religious status. 
Under these systems, maintaining control, curtailing mass political mobilization and keeping the 
status quo are paramount. Wimmer notes, that the years of control by the Caliphate in Ottoman 
Turkey and then the British Empire meant ‘(t)raditions of statehood were weak’ in Iraq and that 
there was little ‘administrative penetration, effective control of violence and service extension 
to the masses of the population’ (2003: 114). Since they occupied Iraq, the British worked to 
establish a local government by uniting the three previously autonomous waylays: Basra, 
Baghdad and Mosul, and installing ‘King Faisal I’ as the first king of the Iraqi Monarchy for the 
modern history of Iraq. For ethno-religious reasons, Arab Shi’a and ethnic Kurds did not 
participate in the new government’s structures and positions (Isakhan 2016). The British thus 
cooperated closely with Iraq’s Sunni minority, who became the ruling elites distributing public 
services in an unfair manner towards other ethno-religious groups, including Arab Shi’a and 
ethnic Kurds. Forming an inclusive government, pushed British and Faisal I to adopt quasi-
democratic reforms that led to the application of some practices such as the development of a 
highly patriotic national school curriculum, a new constitution, and a Parliament consisting of 
both a Majlis Al-Nuwab (Chamber of Deputies) and a Majlis Al-Ayan (Senate) in 1924. Both of 
them tried to represent Arab Shi’a and ethnic Kurds, but their representation was merely 
pseudo (Isakhan 2016). This system created lasting socio-economic disparities between Iraqi 
communities (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1991). Unlike other countries around the world 
breaking away from colonial rule, independence in the Arab region did not mean ‘authentic self-
government’ and certainly did not result in independence from outside powers whether British, 
American or Soviet during the Cold War (Jreisat 1997: 19). During both occupations, British and 
Americans ruled largely behind governmental structures and institutions through a system of 
political advisors appointed to the main departments of Iraqi government to ensure that British 
and Americans’ interests were/are adequately represented within the system. 
Iraq continued a traditional elite system with a monarchy from 1920 to 1958 (from 1920 to 1932 
Iraq was under the British mandate before gaining nominal independence in 1932). The newly 
established Iraqi state faced three challenges in terms of building governmental-administrative 
structures: (1) recovering from colonial rule; (2) legitimizing the new national structures that 
had been established during British rule and (3) empowering citizens (Fuccaro 1997; Tripp 2002; 
Younis 2011). During the Iraqi Monarchy, there were attempts to create an Arab nation by 
centralizing the education system, universal conscription into the army, and a Baghdad-trained 
unified administration (Wimmer 2003). Rihani described the Iraq that resulted at this time as 
‘exist(ing) within the messy complexity zone that combined order and some chaos: an existence 
that presented successes, reverses, compromises, and many uncertainties’ (2015: 118). 
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The period of the first Iraqi republic (1958–68) conforms to the collegial bureaucratic elite 
category (Heady 2001) as it was a state led by groups of military officers who came to power 
over Iraq in a coup d’états. While using appeals to statehood and the public interest to 
legitimize the coup and describing it as a revolution, the political/bureaucratic system was not 
so different from the traditional elite system. During the 1950s, development programmes were 
hindered by a lack of skilled civil servants and low pay (Jreisat 1997). The revolution in 1958 was 
meant to bring order, but the rise of the Arab Socialist Renaissance or ‘Ba’ath’ Party and 
subsequent ascendance of Saddam Husain to president in 1979 brought increased repression 
and brutality. Rihani notes, ‘[t]he reasonable level of governance that existed in Iraq before 
1958, relative to standards in the region, evaporated rapidly’ (2015: 119). Within a decade, the 
collegial bureaucratic elite system in Iraq was replaced by a dominant party regime (1968–2003) 
(Heady 2001). The spread of Ba’athism in the 1960s and 1970s emphasized Arab unity, socialism 
and state control over natural resources for the benefit of the public; however, the reality in Iraq 
was autocratic rule with no protection of human rights and nationalized resources only 
benefiting the elite few as well as routine and repeated violations of the constitution (Fuccaro 
1997; Jreisat 1997; Tripp 2002). During this dominant party regime, all economic and 
administrative elites and civil servants had to members of the Ba’ath Party and – if loyal to the 
regime – avoided the violence enacted on others in society. There were few civic groups 
independent of the Ba’ath Party (Baram 2014; Faust 2015) and informants within governmental-
administrative structures kept people in line (Makiya 1998). Gradually, administrative-
governmental and social networks through which civicness is normally produced and any hope 
for an independent civil service, were destroyed. Extreme hardships due to wars, including the 
Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 and the 1991 Gulf War, severe economic sanctions imposed 
through the United Nations (1990-2003 and beyond) and Ba’ath regime repression in the 1980s 
and 1990s, devastated civil society and lead people to rely more and more on familial, tribal and 
ethno-sectarian networks of support (Younis 2011). Late in the 1980s and into the early 1990s, 
there was a renewed emphasis on public service skills and meeting public needs, particularly for 
health services, however, that ended with the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent international 
economic boycott (Jreisat 1997). Rihani describes the sequence of events from the 1950s to 
today as going from ‘complexity through rigid order into chaotic disorder’ (2015: 118). 
After the overthrow of Saddam Husain by an international coalition organized by the United 
States in 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established to govern Iraq, with the 
expectation of transferring authority to Iraqis, including preparation of a new democratic system 
(i.e. a federal parliamentary republic). The CPA and later the United States including its allies 
supported the federal parliamentary republic to empower all Iraqi communities to effectively 
participate in their rule. Unlike the British occupation, Arab Shi’a and Kurds have been involved 
in ruling Iraqi governmental structures while the Sunni community refrained from participation. 
The regime that emerged from this project appears to be a polyarchal competitive regime with 
competition among federal parties. It also exhibits political forces working towards 
independence – or, at least autonomy – for the northern region under the guise of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG). Heady (2001) describes the polyarchal competitive type of system 
as not being conducive with regards the adoption of routine elections, free speech and 
representative institutions with divisions of power; but, that they resulting government has 
proven to exhibit competitive elections in that one party could peaceably replace another. 
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Instead of one dominant party, there are multiple parties, however, they are all competing for 
resources to reward loyalists from within patronage networks. 
The so-called ‘de-Ba’athification’ effort carried out following 2003 to rid the Iraqi government 
and administration of Ba’ath party members left an inexperienced public service and moreover, 
one where public servants now often owe their jobs to ethnic or sectarian allegiances (Rihani 
2015). Recognizing the need for experienced public servants, former Ba’ath party members are 
being rehired in some instances for their skills (Faust 2015; Pfiffner 2010). Governmental 
structures created to share power in Iraq, including local control of security forces, a strong 
prime minister, weak president, inclusive cabinet and proportional elections, have simply 
reinforced ethno-religious parties. These parties have cemented their control by deploying their 
loyalists and even family members in not only federal and provincial governmental structures, 
but also as executives for non-governmental organizations and other seemingly independent 
groups (Wimmer 2003; Younis 2011). Corruption, the awarding of government contracts to 
party members, gross disparities between elites and the mass public as well as the absence of 
adherence to constitutional rules has damaged public confidence in the government (Al-Ali 
2014; Diamond 2004; Younis 2011). 
Thus, across the modern state apparatus and varied regime types, stable and unbiased 
institutions, nor a professional and independent civil service have not been able to function for 
long enough periods to gain traction. Regimes aside, in terms of broad cultural and religious 
dimensions, Iraq has been characterized as being ‘restrained’, ‘short term oriented’ (Hofstede et 
al. 2010) and Islamic (Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life 2009) by scholars. 
A restrained culture is described as one with strict social norms, curbing gratifications found in 
having fun and enjoying life. The opposite of a ‘restrained’ culture is an ‘indulgent’ culture. In 
general, indulgent cultures are associated with PSM (Kim 2015), democracy, higher percentages 
of happy people and greater wealth (Hofstede et al. 2010). In World Values Survey data, key 
differences in societies who are ‘short term oriented’ as opposed to ‘long term (or future) 
oriented’ are that short term oriented societies find service to others to be important along with 
honouring traditions and family (Hofstede et al. 2010). Studies of the Islamic perspective on 
human resource management find principles and practices covering the welfare of employees, 
organizations, society and work as part of practising one’s faith by contributing to the welfare of 
society (Rana and Malik 2016). This emphasis on work in general benefiting society is part of the 
Islamic philosophy called ehsan. Under ehsan ‘everything in the universe derives its legitimacy 
from facilitating the interaction and growth of human beings’ to the betterment of society (Ali 
2010: 694). For example, ehsan means Islamic human resources management is about the 
community’s general welfare and not just about individuals or the organization as might be 
found in western human resources management (Ali 2010). Ismael and Ismael (2015) note that 
the US administrators controlling the Iraqi transition from a dictatorship to a democracy did not 
recognize this latent social contract. US administrators thought Iraqi society tended toward 
authoritarianism, which then had to be controlled. They failed to notice that the ‘modern Iraqi 
state (sits) atop an ancient civilizational basin, with foundations of human civilization, 
agriculture, urban life, rule of law, etc.’ and the spirit of social justice rooted in religious beliefs 
throughout Iraq (Ismael and Ismael 2015: 241). 
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The change of regimes in Iraq over time show public servants operating under conditions of 
uncertainty, repression and loyalty to elites which can impact which, if any, traditional PSM 
components (self-sacrifice, politics and policies, compassion and equality, public interest, 
bureaucratic governance, and customer orientation) ring true in the Iraqi context. Bureaucratic 
service to elites is similar to what Houston (2014) found in post-communist states which had 
loyalty to an institution, the community party, vs. loyalty to the ‘public interest’. This could 
result in the public interest component of PSM being less relevant and dampen the customer 
service component in favour of service to elites and party loyalists. Under these conditions and 
the lack of a consistently resourced public service can result in a lack of accountability, which 
might show in the bureaucratic governance dimension of PSM. In addition, in Iraq, the 
institutionalized elites have been highly variable from traditional elites; collegial bureaucratic 
elites; dominant-party elites and polyarchal competitive sectarian elites (Heady 2001: 313). The 
lack of stable institutions might make PSM in Iraq similar to that in Ghana, where there are 
strong commitments to social justice but a lack of a long-term commitment to public service and 
institutions (Brenya et al. 2016). The informer culture under Saddam Husain and consistent 
problems with corruption might mean PSM in Iraq performs similarly to what Moloney and Chu 
(2016) found in Jamaica with PSM components such as civic duty, self-sacrifice, commitment to 
public interest and compassion all prevalent. In Iraq, the repression of ‘out’ groups by ‘in’ groups 
may negatively impact the compassion and equality component of traditional PSM measures. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that a pro-social foundation over an institutional foundation for 
PSM might fit the Iraqi context due to the lack of stable institutions, a culture focused on service 
to others (Hofstede et al. 2010) and widespread adherence to ehsan which emphasizes 
benefiting society (Ali 2010). 
Data and methods 
For this study we examined how existing measures of PSM performed in a tough governance 
setting such as that found in Iraq while also looking for what ‘public service’ meant to Iraqi 
public servants and how they pursued the public interest. For the PSM measure, we adopted the 
same PSM items tested by Vandenabeele (2008) in a multidimensional model administered to 
Flemish state civil servants. The 47 items measured the components: politics and policies, public 
interest, compassion, self-sacrifice, equality, bureaucratic governance and customer orientation. 
In Vandenabeele’s (2008) study, a factor analysis of the Flemish survey resulted in a reduced 
number of items and factors identified as: politics and policies, public interest, compassion, self-
sacrifice and democratic governance. Appendix 1 lists the items used in the Iraqi study, including 
their descriptive statistics and categories. We also tested a five-item unidimensional model, 
using two of the same items and three similar items used by Kim (2017) (see Appendix 1). The 
questionnaire we administered consisted of three parts: (1) personal/demographic/work 
information, (2) the PSM items (Vandenabeele 2008) and additional items related to how 
respondents determine what is in the public interest (Johnson 2012), and (3) an open ended 
question asking for personal definitions of ‘public service’. 
Creating and distributing the survey was a multi-step process. After crafting the questionnaire 
we had it translated from the English original into the Arabic language, before then having it 
translated back into English by two different translators to verify meaning. We then created an 
electronic link to the survey using Qualtrics Software so that it could be made securely 
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accessible online. We then contacted a group of managers and employees who worked in 
human resources departments in both private and public sector agencies in Iraq and asked them 
to email the link to their employees. At this first step, we estimate that 400 e-mails went out 
initially. The public sector agencies we contacted included all the major central ministries, 
including the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research and the 
Ministry of Oil. Through this process we discovered that many agencies also communicated by 
Facebook and LinkedIn, whereupon we then took an added step to distribute the survey link via 
these electronic networks as well. By using this additional technique we could protect the 
identity of participants and give them a freer choice as to whether to participate in the survey or 
not helping to mitigate bias, which is a common concern for PSM research (Van der Wal 2015). 
The questionnaire was launched in late March of 2014, which happened to be at the same time 
that ISIS/ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) emerged in Iraq. ISIS/ISIL, a jihadist group, 
expanded rapidly into areas composed predominantly of Sunni communities in Iraq and Syria. 
One of the most important reasons for the emergence of ISIS/ISIL is the marginalization of 
certain sectors of the population, unemployment, sedition and corruption (Kfir 2014). The 
survey remained open until July of 2015 resulting in 325 responses from those in the public 
sector. We left the questionnaire open as long as we could to maximize response rates. We 
received responses from both private sector and public sector employees for a total of 428, but 
we only include responses from public sector employees in this study. We are unable to 
calculate a response rate because we cannot be certain about how the survey link was shared 
across social media. 
Table 1 shows characteristics of the respondents, such as, sex, age, education and managerial 
status. Respondents were in the areas of: transportation (39), justice such as lawyers or judges 
(31), lab workers (23), planner-urban designers (18), commerce (10), security officials (10), 
pharmacists (9) as well as a mix from finance, geologists, dentists, doctors, teachers, engineers, 
technicians and others. They cross six geopolitical regions in Iraq. Almost half of those surveyed 
(46.5 per cent) had Ph.D.s, but despite the overwhelming number of Ph.D.s, only 16 per cent 
were managers and 52 per cent of the respondents indicated they deal directly with the public. 
Table 1: Background Characteristics of Respondents (n=325). 
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 Characteristics Number Percentages 
Sex Male 247 76.0 
 Female 74 22.8 
 No response 4 1.2 
Age 22–29 51 15.7 
 30–39 187 57.5 
 40–49 51 15.7 
 50–67 17 5.2 
 No response 19 5.8 
Education High school 13 4.0 
 2-Year associate degree 113 34.8 
 Undergraduate degree 42 12.9 
 Master degree 5 1.5 
 Ph.D. 151 46.5 
 No response 1 .3 
Manager? Yes 53 16.3 
 No 270 83.1 




Yes 169 52.0 
 No 154 47.4 
 No response 2 0.6 
Region North region (Mosul and 
Kurkuk) 
25 7.7 
 Kurdistan-Iraq region 
(Arbil, Dahuk and 
Sulaymania) 
15 4.6 
 Middle region (Dyala, 





 Baghdad 140 43.1 
 Middle Euphrates region 
(Babil, Karbala, Najaf 
and Qadisiyah) 
72 22.2 
 Southern region 
(Basrah, Muthana, Di 
Qar and Missan) 
39 12.0 
 No response 1 .3 
 
 
We performed two sets of confirmatory factor analyses to determine the best fitting model for 
these data. All analyses were performed using maximum likelihood as implemented by the 
lavaan package (Rosseel 2012) within R version 3.4.0 (R Core Team 2017). In the first analysis 
set, we started with the original multidimensional model from Vandenabeele (2008). In the 
second set, we tested a five-item unidimensional model based on Kim (2017) with two of the 
same items and three similar items. The unidimensional model fit well with the first attempt. 
With respect to the multidimensional model, however, multiple analyses were conducted. As we 
were wary of our analysis sequence leading to results tied to this data set and that would not 
generalize, for each analysis, we used a bootstrap procedure whereby 1000 bootstrap 
replications of the original data set were drawn at random and with replacement across 
participants. Each CFA model was applied to all 1000 bootstrapped data sets and decisions were 
then made based on the distribution of model fit statistics and modification indices. Items 
demonstrating poor model fit based on normalized residuals larger than two in absolute value 
were discarded, as were items with negatively worded stems as each exhibited poor model fit. 
For each analysis, we report the model fit statistics for the original data set along with the range 
of the statistic based on the bootstrap analysis. 
To understand conceptually what the PSM measure is demarcating, the unidimensional PSM 
measure from our unidimensional CFA analysis and the one reliable subscale, self-sacrifice, from 
the multidimensional CFA analysis, were correlated with measures concerning how public 
servants determine what they believe to be in the public’s interest. In the survey, respondents 
were asked, ‘[h]ow important is each of the following in helping you decide what’s in the 
public’s interest?’. They were asked to rate the following on a 1–5 scale, with 1 being ‘Not 
important at all’ and 5 being ‘Very important’: elected officials; citizens; adopted plans; your 
own professional opinion/expertise; and your knowledge of the community’s history, culture 
and current events. Lastly, to look for any issues with how universal the PSM measure is across 
Iraq, analysis of variance was used to see if there were any differences across the six regions in 
Iraq using the unidimensional PSM scores and then using the self-sacrifice subscale scores from 
the multidimensional PSM measure. To further understand what PSM is measuring in Iraq, data 
from an open-ended question asking for personal definitions of ‘public service’ were categorized 
using directed content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Where possible, comments were 
placed into the original Perry and Wise (1990) public service motive categories: rational 
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(fashioning public policy, advocacy), norm-based (loyalty to government, public interest, equity), 
or affective (noble causes). 185 respondents provided comments. 
Results 
The unidimensional model analysis tested the fit of a single PSM factor using five items similar 
to a measure used by Kim (2017). The analysis of the original data set provided a model that 
demonstrated a perfect fit (RMSEA=0, CFI=1). Further, in each of the 1000 bootstrap 
replications, the model also demonstrated a perfect fit. The standardized factor loadings and 
unique variances of the analysis can be found in Table 2. Based on the bootstrap analysis, all five 
items on the scale had factor loadings that were statistically non-zero. The reliability coefficient 
(Guttman-Chronbach alpha) was .63, n=274. 
Table 2: Unidimensional model standardized factor loadings and unique variances. 




Item Est CI Est CI 
Serving the public interest is an important drive in my 
daily life (at work or outside work) 
.595 .59–.60 .647 .64–.65 
I am one of those rare people who would risk personal 
loss to help someone 
.325 .32–.33 .895 .89–.90 
Making a difference in society means more to me than 
personal achievements 
.555 .55–.56 .692 .69–.70 
I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the 
good of society 
.688 .68–.69 .527 .52–.53 
Without solidarity, our society is doomed to fall apart .354 .35–.36 .874 .87–.88 
Note: Est is the estimate of the statistic from the original data set. CI is the 95% confidence 
interval from the bootstrap analyses. 
The initial multidimensional model of Vandenabeele (2008) demonstrated poor model fit with 
respect to the CFI (CFI=.576) yet good model fit with respect to the RMSEA (RMSEA=0.052). 
Further, the bootstrap analysis of the data yielded many non-converged results, calling into 
question the stability of the original model analysis. After subsequent revision, a final 
multidimensional model was developed that demonstrated better model fit (RMSEA=0.040, 
CFI=0.884) and converged for 960 of 1000 bootstrap analyses (RMSEA CI=0.03–0.07; CFI 
CI=0.69–0.93). We note the bootstrap confidence intervals did not include the original analysis 
estimates as an indicator of how sensitive model fit statistics are to the individual data set. Table 
3 lists the standardized factor loadings and unique variances for the 25 items of the model. 








Politics and policies factor Est CI Est CI 
To me, before anything, good civilians should 
think of society 
.53 .27–1.0 .72 .00–.93 
To me, a civil servant cannot be politically 
affiliated 
.31 .10–.57 .91 .67–.99 
Public Interest Factor     
Serving the public interest is an important drive 
in my daily life (at work or outside work) 
.74 .63–.83 .45 .31–.61 
I voluntary and unselfishly contribute to my 
community 
.77 .64–.90 .41 .19–.59 
To me, serving the public interest is more 
important than helping individual persons 
.35 .21–.53 .84 .72–.96 
Government should curb individual liberties in 
order to protect society 
.14 –.02–.30 .98 .91–1.0 
Compassion + Equality Factor     
Fighting poverty is an important duty of 
government 
.62 .46–.75 .62 .43–.79 
Without solidarity, our society is doomed to fall 
apart 
.53 .33–.72 .72 .48–.89 
To me, helping people who are in trouble is 
very important 
.51 .36–.67 .74 .55–.87 
To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare 
of the others 
.36 .18–.51 .87 .74–.97 
Tolerance towards other cultures is crucial .43 .27–.59 .82 .66–.93 
To me, public servants should not be led by 
their political stances 
.32 .11–.50 .90 .76–.98 
One should always respect the opinion of 
others, even if it is not in their best interest 
.34 .14–.49 .88 .76–.98 
People who think they are treated unfairly 
should take care of it themselves 
.24 .08–.38 .94 .86–.99 
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I feel government should target those who 
experience financial or social problems 
.29 .11–.43 .92 .82–.99 
Self-Sacrifice Factor     
Making a difference in society means more to 
me than personal achievements 
.70 .58–.79 .51 .37–.66 
I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for 
the good of society 
.55 .39–.68 .70 .53–.85 
I feel people should give back to society more 
than they get from it 
.66 .56–.74 .56 .45–.68 
Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than 
myself 
.66 .55–.76 .56 .42–.69 
I am one of those rare people who would risk 
personal loss to help someone 
.48 .17–.48 89 .77–.97 
Bureaucratic Governance Factor     
If there are clear rules, one should not deviate 
from these 
.65 .40–.81 .58 .35–.84 
It is important that public servants account for 
all the costs they make 
.52 .31–.68 .73 .54–.90 
When something goes wrong at work, the 
superior is accountable 
.27 .13–.47 .93 .78–.98 
Customer Orientation Factor     
If the service is bad, even a good product is 
worthless 
.74 .50–1.0 .46 .00–.75 
If the customer is satisfied, the job is done .46 .24–.63 .79 .61–.94 
Six subscales ere developed consisting of the factors in the multidimensional model: politics and 
policies, public interest, compassion + equality, self-sacrifice, bureaucratic governance and 
customer orientation. One of the subscales demonstrated very good internal consistency 
(Guttman-Chronbach alpha), self-sacrifice=.72, n=281 while the remaining five subscales 
demonstrated reliability too low to be useful as standalone scales (politics and policies=.26, 
bureaucratic governance=.40, customer orientation=.51, public interest=0.51, compassion + 
equality=0.58) (n ranged from 269 to 294). Table 3 has the list of survey items that make up the 
subscales. 
The results of the Pearson correlations between the unidimensional measure of PSM and how 
respondents decide what is in the public interest are below. The unidimensional PSM measure 
(five items averaged together) (mean=3.95, SD=.52, n=300) is positively and significantly 
correlated, from highest to lowest, with the respondent’s own knowledge of the community’s 
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history, culture and current events r(280)=.27, p<.01; citizens r(281) =.20, p<.01; the 
respondent’s own professional opinion/expertise r(281) =.20, p<.01; adopted plans r(281) =.17, 
p<.01; but not with elected officials r(282) =.03, p=.67. The highest correlation is with using 
one’s own community knowledge then citizens and one’s own expertise is next in importance. 
Descriptive statistics for the items measuring how one determines the public interest are in 
Table 4. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics – How to determine the public interest. 







My knowledge of the 
community’s history, 
culture and current 
events 
n 286 283 283 283 282 
Mean 3.13 4.10 4.36 3.78 3.95 
SD 1.35 .81 .70 .79 .79 
The results of the Pearson correlations between the self-sacrifice subscale of PSM and how 
respondents decide what is in the public interest are listed below. The subscale averages the 
five self-sacrifice items together (mean=3.62, SD=.61, n=295). The self-sacrifice subscale is 
positively and significantly correlated with all of the same items as the unidimensional measure, 
but in a slightly different order. The highest is with citizens r(279) =.25, p<.01; then next is one’s 
own knowledge of the community’s history, culture, and current events r(278) =.24, p<.01; then 
one’s own professional opinion/expertise r(279) =.18, p<.01; and adopted plans r(279) =.15, 
p<.05. As with the unidimensional measure, the self-sacrifice subscale is not correlated with 
reliance on elected officials **r(282) =.09, p=.12 to determine what is in the public interest. 
A one-way analysis of variance was conducted to identify any differences across six geopolitical 
regions in Iraq: north (Mosul and Kurkuk), Kurdistan (Arbil, Dahuk and Sulaymania), middle 
(Dyala, Salah Al Dien, Wasit and Anbar), Baghdad, middle Euphrates (Babil, Karbala, Najaf and 
Qadisiyah), and south (Basrah, Muthana, Di Qar and Missan) and the unidimensional PSM score 
and the Self-sacrifice subscale from the multidimensional model. The omnibus F test was 
significant for the unidimensional PSM score, F(5, 293) =2.41, p=.04, partial eta squared=.04, 
which indicates a small effect size. Results for the self-sacrifice subscale, F(5, 288) =2.54, p=.03, 
partial eta squared=.04 were similar. However, follow-up pairwise comparisons for the 
unidimensional PSM score and the self-sacrifice subscale found that all regions were essentially 
equal. 
Results from the content analysis validate the concept of PSM as being one of self-sacrifice and 
pro-social behaviours. 185 respondents provided comments with their definitions of ‘public 
service’. We started by trying to place the comments into the Perry and Wise (1990) 
motivational categories: rational (fashioning public policy, advocacy), norm-based (loyalty to 
government, public interest, equity), or affective (noble causes), however, we found slight 
variations on those definitions. The largest percentage of respondents fit into the affective 
based motives category, but more accurately described as a self-sacrifice category (84 out of 
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185 or 45.4 per cent). Their comments were based on emotion and giving, with respondents 
describing often going beyond what the rules allow and working overtime. A representative 
comment was that, ‘Helping people makes me sleep with peace of mind’. The next highest 
percentage (35.2 per cent) defined public service in terms of accountability, not to government 
as in being loyal to an institution per se, but loyalty to government just as one would be to any 
other employer and to the larger public with comments such as, ‘I’m to use the rules to serve 
the public and government because I’m employed by the government’. This goes along with 
‘adopted plans’ having the highest mean score on its importance to respondents determining 
what is in the public interest (see Table 4). The third category is a subset of the original rational 
based motives with a focus on advocacy. Eighteen respondents (9.7 per cent) characterized their 
public service in terms of using the rules to their fullest extent to support the neediest people, 
especially those with disabilities. The fourth category is a variation on the norm-based motives 
related to pursuing the public interest. However, more accurately, it could be called civic duty. 
Those falling into this category (9.7 per cent) want to look out for the general welfare of society 
through their civic duty or public sector jobs. 
Discussion – A foundation and some nuances 
Limitations of this study include its small sample size, as well as potential sample bias by its 
delivery method only reaching those either with email or social media networks and access to 
the Internet. This means we may have reached a group of like-minded people, as indicated 
perhaps by the large number of respondents holding PhDs. Also, as with all survey research, 
there is the issue of volunteer bias, which may account for the high emphasis on self-sacrifice 
seen in the results. The survey was open during a time in Iraq which saw the rise of ISIS and 
increased levels of sectarian violence, violence that was directed at civil servants in the areas 
falling under ISIS control. However, such rapidly changing contexts cannot be avoided when 
conducting this type of research in a tough governance setting. Wanting to keep the survey 
length manageable by limiting the number of survey items and writing and translating the 
survey in 2013 meant that newer international measures and variations in wording were not 
tested. 
In looking for advances in understanding PSM, Perry and Vandenabeele (2015) ask for more 
research that disaggregates the PSM construct, examines how PSM differs by regime, and 
measures connections between PSM and loyalty to governance regimes as institutions. By 
focusing on the unique case of Iraq we were able to explore the PSM construct and verify self-
sacrifice and pro-social values as a foundation of PSM. In a country lacking in regime and 
institutional stability, the other PSM dimensions proved to be unreliable measures. We connect 
PSM to regime type by using comparative public administration typologies. Bringing PSM and 
comparative public administration literatures together can advance both (O’Leary and Van Slyke 
2010). Regimes in Iraq have been imposed from the outside and they serve political elites to the 
detriment of the general welfare. The Iraqi public and other ‘Arab people continue to be largely 
disconnected from their political orders and not active participants in the public policy-making 
processes of their countries’ (Jreisat 2003: 389). Our findings show respondents defining public 
service in terms of their willingness to sacrifice for others, but not completely abandoning rules. 
Rules and accountability are still important, but they are not connected to government as an 
‘institution’, but are a commitment to government as an ‘employer’. ‘Work’ as contributing to 
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the betterment of society, whether one works for the public or private sector, is part of Islam 
and the philosophy of ehsan. PSM research has advanced knowledge regarding associations 
between Confucian values and PSM (Kim 2009b; Liu et al. 2011; Yun 2006; Yung 2014). Similar 
insights could be gained from further research looking at Islamic public servants, ehsan and 
PSM. 
Using a multidimensional measure and a unidimensional measure with the Iraqi data allowed us 
to look for deviations from past PSM constructs, but also look for a foundational concept. The 
self-sacrifice dimension being the only reliable subscale from the multidimensional model and 
the good fit of the unidimensional model focus attention on self-sacrifice and pro-social values 
as foundations. The consistency of the measures across Iraqi regions also attests to the universal 
nature of the pro-social concepts. Correlating the self-sacrifice subscale and unidimensional 
PSM measures with ‘how’ public servants decide what is in the public interest gives insight into 
how disconnected PSM is from Iraqi institutions. Both measures were most correlated with 
public servants using their own community-based knowledge and citizens to decide what was in 
the public interest. Less emphasis was on professional expertise and adopted plans. They did 
not rely on elected officials. ‘In the long run, country- or regime-specific (e.g., parliamentary 
versus presidential governance systems) commitment to the governance regime subscales could 
be bundled with universal subscales, such as self-sacrifice and compassion, to create an 
integrated public service motivation construct’ (Perry and Vandenabeele 2015: 696). It is 
important for future research to look at regime types, but also political control of the 
bureaucracy, the amount of public engagement, transparency, and the professionalization of 
public servants. Further PSM research in developing countries could test Jreisat’s (2012: 40) 
assertion that developing systems may need ‘programmatic commitment, managerial flexibility, 
and creative leadership’ which can be hindered by classic western-based ‘rigid bureaucratic and 
hierarchical structures’. More insights into good governance and what works in different 
contexts can be gained from examining PSM across developed and developing countries. 
This study illustrates the importance of continuing to ask public servants themselves how they 
define public service. The Iraqi comments provide nuances related to rational motives being 
about advocating for those most in need vs. setting policy (advocacy), norm-based motives 
referring to rules as a loyalty to one’s employer and the public vs. to government institutions 
(accountability), norm-based dedication to the public interest through public sector work (civic 
duty) and the overwhelming prevalence of affective motives and self-sacrifice for the greater 
good (self-sacrifice). It appears there is a need to explore other PSM dimensions divorced from 
loyalty to institutions and politics to fully understand public service motives in non-western, 
developing countries. The results show the reliability of the self-sacrifice dimension and a 
unidimensional measure of PSM forming a foundation for a pro-social and universal PSM 
measure. This pro-social orientation emerges even within a tough governance context where 
institutions are contested, political elites rule and resources, stability, a public voice, and 
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 Mean SD Categories 
I feel government should target those who experience 
financial or social problems 
4.35 0.89 PI 
Enough money can make me do a lot of things (I) 4.19 0.78 SS 
I think that public servants should implement every 
political decision, regardless of their own conviction 
3.29 1.13 PP 
To me, helping people who are in trouble is very important 4.45 0.72 C 
It doesn’t matter if you tried your best; if the result is not 
good you did a bad job 
2.99 1.12 BG 
To me, a civil servant cannot be politically affiliated 4.04 1.10 PP 
Government should curb individual liberties in order to 
protect society 
2.85 1.11 PI 
I voluntary and unselfishly contribute to my community 4.15 0.71 PI 
Serving the public interest is an important drive in my daily 
life (at work or outside work)*+ 
4.33 0.72 PI 
I do not care much about politicians (I) 3.47 1.21 PP 
To me, serving the public interest is more important than 
helping individual persons 
3.61 0.89 PI 
I am more than others involved in my community 3.07 0.72 PI 
To me, before anything, good civilians should think of 
society 
4.19 0.73 PI 
To me, good governance depends heavily on the quality of 
public servants 
4.26 0.78 PP 
I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged (I) 1.84 0.84 C 
To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of the 
others 
3.94 0.91 C 
I have little compassion for people in need who are 
unwilling to take the first step to help themselves (I) 
1.99 1.03 C 
I seldom think about the welfare of other people whom I 
do not know personally (I) 
2.26 0.95 C 
Without solidarity, our society is doomed to fall apart*+ 4.54 0.71 C 
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To me, public servants should be at the disposal of 
ministers 
2.89 1.07 PP 
Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself 3.53 0.90 SS 
Making a difference in society means more to me than 
personal achievements* 
3.83 0.89 SS 
I feel people should give back to society more than they 
get from it 
3.78 0.95 SS 
I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss 
to help someone*+ 
3.20 0.89 SS 
In the end, everybody is self-interested and so am I (I) 2.80 0.93 SS 
If you are not self-interested, you are being unfair with 
yourself (I) 
3.06 0.90 SS 
I have great confidence in the politicians who control 
government 
1.60 0.88 PP 
People who think they are treated unfairly should take 
care of it themselves 
3.39 0.96 E 
It is self-evident that you benefit your friends (I) 3.65 0.84 E 
I do not think people should always be treated equally 
(there are various good reasons not to do so: time. 
money…) (I) 
2.92 1.16 E 
To me, public servants should not be led by their political 
stances 
4.33 0.86 E 
One should always respect the opinion of others, even if it 
is not in their best interest 
3.95 1.03 E 
‘Politics’ is a dirty word (I) 3.26 1.25 PP 
When something goes wrong at work, the superior is 
accountable 
3.42 1.04 BG 
Even in the case of major disasters, public service should 
be maintained 
3.88 0.95 BG 
If there are clear rules, one should not deviate from these 4.27 0.72 BG 
In case of an emergency, a public servant can ignore the 
law 
2.86 1.04 BG 
Everybody is entitled to a good service, even if it costs a lot 
of money 
3.88 0.95 E 
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No government should pursue financial profit 2.90 1.09 PI 
Unsatisfied customers often made mistakes themselves (I) 3.02 0.95 CO 
Having good administrative processes is far more 
important than being customer-friendly (I) 
3.08 1.04 CO 
If the service is bad, even a good product is worthless 3.84 0.88 CO 
If the customer is satisfied, the job is done 3.71 0.91 CO 
Fighting poverty is an important duty of government 4.67 0.63 C 
It is important that public servants account for all the costs 
they make 
3.92 0.90 BG 
I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of 
society* 
3.79 0.83 SS 
Tolerance towards other cultures is crucial 4.45 0.79 E 
  n=325  
Notes: 
(I) I scores were inverted. 
Categories from Vandenabeele (2008) – Politics and Policies (PP), Public Interest (PI), 
Compassion (C), Self-sacrifice (SS), Equality (E), Bureaucratic Governance (BG), Customer 
Orientation (CO). 
*Five items used for unidimensional model. Two items are the same as used by Kim (2017) and 
three*+ are similar items from the same categories. The three original items from (Kim 2017) 
were: ‘Meaningful public service is important to me’, ‘I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights 
of others even if it means I will be ridiculed’, and ‘I am often reminded by daily events about 
how dependent we are on one another’. 
 
 
